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NOTES
DONATION-OPTIONAL PAYMENT HOMESTEAD STOCK MAY BE THE
SUBJECT OF A MANUAL DONATION
The decedent had owned optional payment shares in a
homestead association represented by a certificate or optional
share account book. Three days prior to her death, she filled
in the back of her optional share account book transferring and
assigning to minor donees and donees' mother all right, title,
and interest in all optional payment shares represented by the
certificate, and she gave the book to donees' mother. The day
before the death of decedent, the mother presented and sur-
rendered the book to the homestead association which trans-
ferred the $11,630.48 balance to defendants. Decedent's optional
share account book and its ledger card were cancelled and a
new optional share account book and accompanying ledger
card were issued in the name of defendants. The administrator
of decedent's succession filed an action to have returned to the
succession decedent's optional share account book, or alterna-
tively, judgment against defendants in the amount of $11,630.48.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment dis-
missing plaintiff's suit and held that decedent's delivery of the
executed transfer form and the optional share account book to
defendant was a valid manual gift of the money represented
by the book. Menard v. Muhs, 196 So.2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 744, 199 So.2d 181 (1967).
Under Louisiana law, a donation inter vivos is defined as
an act by which the donor divests himself presently and irre-
vocably of the thing given in favor of the donee who accepts it.1
The Louisiana Civil Code requires that the donation inter vivos
of immovable property or of incorporeal rights must be made
by a notarial act under penalty of nullity.2 The inter vivos
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
2. Id. art. 1536. Article 931 of the Code Napoleon formulates the rule
as follows: "All instruments which contain an inter vivos donation shall be
concluded before a notary in the form usual for contracts, and the original
will be kept on file by the notary, under the sanction of nullity." The rule
was formulated by Daguesseau and made its appearance in the French
Ordinance of 1731. 3 PLANIOL, CIvIL LAW TREATISE no. 2525 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959). The reasons for this requirement are: 1. The protection of
the donor, for the freedom of his action can be fraudulently influenced,
and he can deprive himself of his property under a dominating outside
influence. 2. The revocability of the donation. This seems to have been
the principal consideration, for if the instrument is under private signature
the donor has the power to abolish the donation by destroying the evidence
of title; thus the requirement that the instrument be filed and preserved
by the notary. Id. no. 2526.
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donation of movables may be made through the use of an
authentic act whether the movable is corporeal or incorporeal.8
However, the manual gift is the donation of corporeal movables
accompanied by real delivery and is exempt from this formality.4
The requirement of authentic form has been the source of
some judicial confusion. The main problems have arisen in
connection with alleged manual donations of credit instruments
and other documents which purport to have legal effect. When
dealing with such documents it becomes necessary to distinguish
between the document and the obligation which it represents. 5
The necessity of this distinction arises out of the fact that the
document is a corporeal movable and may be donated by manual
delivery.6 The obligation or credit represented by the docu-
ment, however, is an incorporeal movable and may be validly
donated only through the use of an authentic act.7 The practical
problem, then, becomes one of determining whether the manual
donation of a legal document results in the valid transfer of
both document and obligation.
Louisiana jurisprudence has been inconsistent in making a
distinction between the document and the obligation which it
represents. On the one hand, there are cases in which the
distinction between the corporeal document and the incorporeal
credit has been followed and the requirement of authentic
form applied. Thus certificates of deposit," the donor's own
promissory note,9 capital stock in a homestead,10 and the
promissory note of a third party1 have been held to be insus-
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1538.
4. Id. art. 1539. In French law exceptions to the formality requirement
for donations Included manual donations of corporeal chattels and credit
instruments payable to the bearer. The actual transfer of the chattel suffices
to transfer the title by donation. This is the only remaining case in French
law of tradition as a mode of transfer, distinct from the agreement. The
rule is traditional in French law. Manual gifts were implicitly recognized
by Article 6 of the Budgetary Act of May 18, 1850, which subjected instru-
ments and judgments acknowledging a manual gift to the respective tax.
3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISm nos. 2533, 2536, 2537 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1762. See also Comment, 9 TUL. L. REv. 602 (1935).
6. LA. Cv. CODE art. 1539.
7. Id. art. 1536.
8. Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930).
9. Succession of Leroy, 157 La. 1077, 103 So. 328 (1925); Miller v. Andrus,
1 La. Ann. 237 (1846); Barriere v. Gladding, 17 La. 144 (1841).
10. Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922). Capital stock
in a homestead was held to be an incorporeal and could not be the object
of manual donation. However, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act permitted
valid transfer without authentic act. See LA. R.S. 12:601-651 (1950).
11. Succession of DePouilly, 22 La. Ann. 97 (1870).
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ceptible of being the object of a manual donation. On the other
hand, the courts have allowed the manual donation of cash,' 2
bonds payable to bearer,1" and checks14 to result in the transfer.
of the obligation without requiring authentic form. The distinc-.
tion between the former and latter class of cases is not readily
apparent but seems to hinge upon whether some act other than
delivery, such as endorsement, is required.15
The instant case involved an alleged manual donation of
homestead association "optional payment" shares. Louisiana law
allows homestead associations to divide their capital into dif-
ferent classifications of stock,16 including "optional payment"
shares which are installment shares. The purchaser may, after,
the first payment has been made, deposit any amount at any
time desired in lieu of the regularly prescribed payment.17 This
type of stock is distinguished from "fully paid" shares in that
fully paid shares are paid for in full at the date of their issue. 8
Optional payment shares may be redeemed for fully paid shares
and the value of either type of stock may be withdrawn at any
time.1" Optional payment shares are further distinguished from
fully paid shares in that a certificate is issued to the owner
of the latter while the owner of the former receives an account
book in which all deposits and withdrawals are entered. In-
12. Succession of Byrnes, 206 La. 1026, 20 So.2d 301 (1944); Guss v.
Mathews, 179 La. 1033, 155 So. 765 (1934); Gibson v. Hearn, 164 La. 65, 113
So. 766 (1927); Succession of Zacharle, 119 La. 150, 43 So. 988 (1907); Suc-
cession of Bidwell, 51 La. Ann. 1970, 26 So. 692 (1899); Succession of Hale,
26 La. Ann. 195 (1874); Azar v. Azar, 185 So.2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
Succession of Moran v. Moran, 25 So.2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Ory
Bros. v. Muller, 128 So. 903 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
13. Succession of Sanders, 171 La. 569, 131 So. 674 (1930); Succession of
McBurney, 162 La. 758, 111 So. 86 (1926).
14. Succession of Leroy, 157 La. 1077, 103 So. 328 (1925); Succession of
Turgeau, 130 La. 650, 58 So. 497 (1912); Succession of Desina, 123 La. 468,
49 So. 23 (1909); Stauffer v. Morgan, 39 La. Ann. 632, 2 So. 98 (1887);
Burke v. Bishop, 27 La. Ann. 465 (1875); Succession of DePouilly, 22 La..
Ann. 97 (1870); Succession of Browne, 176 So.2d 217 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 248 La. 365, 178 So.2d 656 (1965).
15. In French law it is a traditional rule that manual gifts comprise
only corporeal chattels. A creditor's claim cannot, therefore, be transferred
by a manual gift, even if it is represented by a negotiable Instrument trans-
ferable by endorsement. The ownership of the claim can be transferred only
by an appropriate endorsement. By exception, a creditor claim represented
by an instrument to the bearer can be the object of a manual gift. In such
a case, the claim is said to be incorporated in the instrument and belonging
to the actual bearer. 3 PLANIOL, CIvIL CODW LAw TREATism no. 2539 (La. St. IL
Inst. transl. 1959).
16. LA. R.S. 6:740 (1950).
17. Id. 6:741(1)(b).
18. Id. 6:741(3)(a).
19. Id. 6:739, 791.
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cluded within the account book is a "certificate" for the number
of shares for which the depositor initially subscribes. The balance
in the account book determines the number of shares actually
owned at any given time. Certificates are not issued for addi-
tionally acquired shares except upon request.
20
Stock certificates have been consistently treated by the
courts as incorporeal movables not subject to manual donation.2 1
However, it has been held that the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act establishes a method of transferring these incorporeal mov-
ables which supersedes the authentic act requirement of the
Civil Code for donations inter vivos. 22 Although a valid transfer
may be made under its provisions, it has been held that such
a transfer is not a manual gift and is still subject to collation.28
Stock may be transferred under the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act by delivery of the "certificate" endorsed either in blank
or to a specified person by the person appearing on the certi-
ficate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby.
24
When endorsed to a specified person, that person is considered
the owner unless and until he endorses the certificate to
another.25
The sole issue in the instant case was whether a valid
donation inter vivos of the "optional payment" shares had been
made. To resolve this question it was necessary to determine
(1) whether the account book was a "certificate" sufficient in
legal contemplation to bring the transfer within the provisions
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, or (2) whether the account
book represented cash thus making the account similar to a
savings or checking account.
20. Menard v. Muhs, 196 So.2d 536, 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
21. Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922); Succession of
Sinnott v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 105 La. 705, 30 So. 233 (1901); LeBlanc v.
Volker, 198 So. 398 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
22. Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922); Succession of
Hall, 198 So.2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); LeBlanc v. Volker, 198 So. 398
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act is LA. R.S. 12:601-
651 (1950).
23. In LeBlanc v. Volker, 198 So. 398, 401 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940),
the court, after stating a manual gift is not subject to collation, went on
to say "[tlhe transfer of the homestead stock in this case was, in view of
the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Statute, a valid donation
Inter vivos, but it is, nevertheless, the subject of collation, since it is
not and could not be the subject of a manual gift." But see Succession of
Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So.2d 156 (1953), where the court stated that manual
gifts are not per se exempt from collation.
24. LA. R.S. 12:624(A)(1) (1950).
25. Id. 12:623.
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The trial court held that regardless of whether the account
book represented "stock" or "cash" a valid donation had occurred.
The court of appeal, however, preferred the "cash concept" and
made an analogy between the homestead account and money
on deposit in a bank checking account. The executed transfer
form contained in the back of the account book was said to be
in all respects similar to an executed check in the full amount
on deposit in a checking account. It was not considered an
obligation but an unconditional order to pay. It was not viewed
as representing money but for all practical intents as being
money. Thus the court held that the giving of the optional share
account book was a manual gift of the corporeal movable money,
the transfer form and account book simply being the "vehicle
of delivery." 28
The above reasoning appears to be consistent with the
Louisiana jurisprudence regarding checks. It has been held that
the execution and delivery of the donor's own check is a valid
manual donation where it has been accepted or certified by
the drawee before the death of the donor.27 The manual dona-
tion of the check of a third party drawn to the donor's order
and endorsed by the donor is valid, although the check is
presented for payment after the donor's death.28 Seemingly,
as a check is not considered an obligation but an unconditional
order to pay, the sole test applied is one of irrevocability. The
reasoning in the first instance is that the donor loses control
over the funds on deposit as soon as the check is accepted or
certified by the drawee.29 In the second instance, the donor loses
control over both the check and the credit represented thereby,
by endorsement and delivery.80 There appears to have been
only one Louisiana case dealing with the situation of a donor's
check being presented for payment after his death. In Succession
of Schneider8 ' the court held that the gift of a check did not,
as a matter of law, constitute a valid manual gift of corporeal
movable effects. It was held that the donation of a check was
26. Menard v. Muhs, 196 So.2d 536, 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
27. Stauffer v. Morgan, 39 La. Ann. 632, 2 So. 98 (1887); Succession
of DePouilly, 22 La. Ann. 97 (1870); Succession of Browne, 176 So.2d 217
(La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 La. 365, 178 So.2d 656 (1965).
28. Succession of Leroy, 157 La. 1077, 103 So. 328 (1925); Burke v. Bishop,
27 La. Ann. 465 (1875).
29. LA. R.S. 7:70, 187, 188 (1950). See also Note, 42 TUL. L. Rsv. 669, 672
(1968).
30. LA. R.S. 7:30, 52 (1950). See also Note, 42 TUL. L. REv. 669, 672 (1968).
31. 199 So.2d 564 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 34, 202 So.2d
652 (1967).
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not a gift of the money represented thereby, but merely the gift
of an incorporeal right to the donee to present the check to the
bank for payment. Since a check does not operate as an assign-
ment of funds,32 the drawer retained the power to revoke the
gift at any time before the check was accepted by the drawee.
While the court in the instant case was correct in upholding
the validity of the donation, it would appear that the analogy
drawn between the executed transfer form and a check is
incorrect. Treating the two instruments alike overlooks the fact
that a check is a negotiable instrument.33 Such instruments
may be negotiated by transfer from one person to another
so as to constitute the transferee a holder,3 4 who may enforce
payment in his own name.8 5 If payable to bearer they are
negotiated by delivery; if payable to order they are negotiated
by the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery.36 The
account book in the instant case does not appear to be a negoti-
able instrument as it is not an unconditional order to pay. T
On the face of the certificate contained therein is stated the
condition that the account will not be transferred "unless and
until" the transferee has made application and has been accepted
as a member of the association.38 It would appear that if the
account must be regarded as cash, then it is more closely related
to a bank savings account. It has generally been held that an
account on deposit in a bank is an incorporeal right, the valid
donation of which would require a notarial act.89 Where a
power of attorney was given authorizing one to withdraw any
money he desires from a bank savings account, this did not of
itself operate as a donation of the funds even though they were
reduced to possession.4 0 However, where it was shown satis-
factorily that the document was executed as a means of estab-
lishing a donation and the donor's volition to make a gift was
still in operation when the donee actually received the money
32. LA. R.S. 7:189 (1950).
33. Id. 7:185.
34. Id. 7:191.
35. Id. 7:51.
36. Id. 7:30.
37. Id. 6:1(2).
38. Brief for Appellees, Appendix 1, Menard v. Muhs, 196 So.2d 536
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 744, 199 So.2d. 181 (1967).
39. Succession of Housknecht, 135 La. 818, 66 So. 233 (1914); Succession
of Grubbs, 170 So.2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 409, 171
So.2d 666 (1965); Bordelon v. Brown, 84 So.2d 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956);
Northcott v. Livingood, 10 So.2d 401 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
40. Succession of Housknecht, 135 La. 818, 66 So. 233 (1914).
[Vol. 30
NOTES
from the bank, the manual donation was valid.41 Therefore in
order to complete the manual gift of funds on deposit in a bank
it is sufficient that the will of the donor to donate operates
simultaneously with the actual receipt of the corporeal money
into the possession of the donee.42
Applying the results of the jurisprudence to the facts of
the instant case, a valid donation would have occurred under
either the check concept or the savings account concept. There
was a manual delivery of the account book followed by can-
cellation of that book and an actual transfer of the funds to
the donee during the lifetime of the donor. The donative intent
was established, and the funds were put beyond the control
of the donor; thus the gift was irrevocable. 43 Real delivery was
accomplished, as the money was put into the power and control
of the donee.44 However, under either concept, if the donor had
died before transfer of the funds to the donee, there would have
been no real delivery of corporeal movable effects within the
meaning of Civil Code article 1539 and thus no valid manual
gift.45
While the court adopted the "cash concept" it did not clearly
indicate whether the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was applicable.
It is submitted that the statute should have been applied. The
court's opinion seemed to be based upon the characterization
of optional payment shares in a homestead made in Succession
of Mulqueeny46 where such stock was viewed essentially as
funds deposited at a fixed rate of interest, both principal and
interest being subject to withdrawal at any time. That case
involved contradictory testamentary dispositions. The testator
had stipulated a number of cash legacies in addition to a legacy
of any homestead stock or "any interest I may have therein"
to another legatee. After payment of the succession debts there
was not sufficient cash to meet the legacies as the bulk of the
estate remained in the homestead accounts. The Louisiana
Supreme Court applied Civil Code article 163547 and held that
41. Succession of Gorman, 209 La. 1092, 26 So.2d 150 (1946).
42. Id.
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
44. Id. art. 2477: "The tradition or delivery is the transferring of the
thing sold into the power and possession of the buyer."
45. Succession of Schneider, 199 So.2d 564 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 251 La. 34, 202 So.2d 652 (1967); cf. Bordelon v. Brown, 84 So.2d 867
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
46. 248 La. 659, 667, 181 So.2d 384, 387 (1965).
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1635: "If the effects do not suffice to discharge the
particular legacies, the legacies of a certain object must be first taken
19691
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since there was no reference to definitely designated certificates
of stock the legacy was of an uncertain object. Therefore the
homestead accounts were treated as cash and the legacies were
granted out of the accounts. The holding of Mulqueeny has no
application to the instant case because in Mulqueeny the court
was concerned with ascertaining the true intention of the
testator so as to give full effect to the dispositions stated in the
will. In the instant case there was an actual transfer of the
account book coupled with sufficient proof of the donor's intent.
While there are no Louisiana cases directly in point con-
cerning the legal nature of the certificate involved, it has been
held in another state that the provisions of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act are applicable to shares in savings and loan associa-
tions and that a passbook of such associations including an
optional share certificate is a stock certificate within the mean-
ing of that act.48 In addition, it has been held in Louisiana that
a "certificate" of stock is merely paper evidence of ownership of
stock created for convenience. 40 Fully paid shares of homestead
stock have also been characterized as cash on deposit5" in the
same manner as optional payment shares, and there is no doubt
that they may be transferred under the provisions of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act.5' It would appear, therefore, that the option-
al share certificate should be regarded as a stock certificate which
may also be validly transferred under the provisions of that act.
The account book in the instant case contained a "certificate" for
fifteen initially subscribed shares with a par value of $100.00
per share. According to the terms of the transfer form, the stock
represented by the account book was tranferable on the books
of the association when presented by the holder thereof, in per-
son, and properly endorsed. 52 The certificate was presented by
the donee properly endorsed and a transfer was accomplished.
Therefore it is not the similarity of the homestead account with
checks or cash which should have governed, but the Uniform
out. The surplus of the effects must then be proportionally divided among
the legatees of sums of money, unless the testator has expressly declared
that such a legacy shall be paid in preference to the rest, or that the legacy
is given as a recompense for services."
48. Marino Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 35 (1954).
49. Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922).
50. Succession of Homan, 202 La. 591, 605, 12 So.2d 649, 653 (1943);
Dimitry v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 167 La. 875, 877, 120 So. 581, 582
(1929).
51. Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922); LeBlanc v.
Volker, 198 So. 398 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
52. Brief for Appellees, Appendix 1, Menard v. Muhs, 196 So.2d 536
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 744, 199 So.2d 181 (1967).
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Stock Transfer Act. Applying its provisions would have eliminat-
ed the need for making any distinction between the corporeal
document and the incorporeal obligation which it represents.
That act makes no such distinction and merely provides for a
transfer of ownership by endorsement and delivery of the certi-
ficates.53 In addition there would have been no doubt as to the
validity of the transfer in the event of the death of the donor
prior to receipt of the funds. A proper endorsement will be effec-
tual even though the transferor may die or become legally inca-
pacitated or no consideration has been received.34 In Succession
of Hal 55 a valid donation was upheld under the provisions of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act when the donor had endorsed stock
certificates, handed them to the donee who replaced them in the
donor's bank box where they remained until after the donor's
death. Such a result gives true effect to the will of the donor.
While Louisiana Civil Code art. 1536 prohibits the donation
inter vivos of incorporeal rights except by authentic act, its pro-
visions have been superseded by the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act as well as by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Both of these
statutes provide a method for effectively transferring incorporeal
rights or, at the very least, transferring title to instruments which
control the enforcement of these rights. Recognizing this view,
or what is perhaps the better view-that article 1536 of the Civil
Code applies only to such credits or obligations not transferable
by delivery 6 would give full effect to the provisions of those
statutes and would render unnecessary the technical and some-
times artificial distinctions made in the noted case.
In conclusion it must be pointed out that while the require-
ment of formality with regard to donations has for its purpose
the protection of the alleged donor as well as his heirs by requir-
ing evidence of his donative intent, this policy must be balanced
53. LA. R.S. 12:624 (1950).
54. Id. 12:629.
55. 198 So.2d 511, 514 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 974, 200
So.2d 664 (1967). The court found both sufficient intent and delivery to
sustain the validity of the gift.
56. See Succession of Leroy, 157 La. 1077, 103 So. 328 (1925). The con-
curring opinion of Justice St. Paul states that Article 1536 should apply
only to such credits as are not transferable by mere delivery of title:
"Treasury notes, bank notes, gold and silver certificates, are likewise mere
promises to pay money; yet no one doubts that they are subject to manual
gift under R.C.C. art. 1539. Government bonds, state bonds, municipal
bonds, corporate bonds are also mere promissory notes, with interest cou-
pons attached, and this court has held that these are proper objects of a
manual gift without formality whatever, and by mere delivery to the
donee." Id. at 1084, 103 So. at 331.
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against the desire and need for stability and efficiency with re-
gard to transfers of commercial documents. The uniform laws
were adopted to fulfill these needs with a minimum of formality.
,Nor should the absence of a notarial act arouse fear that the
donor will not be protected against fraud and coercion. The
Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides such protection by allow-
ing rescission in the event an endorsement or delivery has been
made under fraud, mistake, or duress.57
Fred Sutherland
PRESCRIPTION OF A CREDIT CARD PURCHASE
Suit was filed by a credit card corporation to recover a sum
of money allegedly due for cardholder's purchases made seven
years before from various business establishments. Defending
cardholder answered, alleging that the credit card purchase was
an open account and thus prescriptible in three years. No pay-
ments had been made between purchase and suit. Held, that the
prescriptive period of three years was applicable, and that since
the plaintiff was an assignee, the period had run. Carte Blanche
Corp. v. Pappas, 216 So.2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
* Credit cards are a modern phenomenon,' and their increasing
use has recently caused considerable debate as to the exact legal
nature of the credit card transaction.2 In the instant case, the
main question confronting the court was the classification of the
cause of action arising from a credit card purchase. It is settled
that the prescriptive period for an obligation arising ex contractu
is generally ten years,8 and because there was a written contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant it could be argued that
a ten-year period would be applicable. On the other hand, the
prescriptive period for an open account, which is also an obliga-
57. LA. R.S. 12:630 (1950).
1. The first case dealing with a credit card was Wanamaker v. Megary,
24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915). One of the best known credit card
plans, Diners' Club, was founded in 1950. In 1964, there were approximately
70 consumer credit card plans in the United States. By 1967, the number
of plans had Increased to about 1,000. Wall Street Journal (Midwest Edition),
Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
2. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 485 (1967); Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VALPARAISO U.L. RmV. 218 (1967); Comment, 48
CALIF. L. RaV. 459 (1960); Note, 35 NOTE DAME LAw. 225 (1960).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544: "In general, all personal actions, except those
before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years."
[Vol. 30
